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Abstract
Bill Clinton ran for president on the theme of change-change in domestic policy and change in foreign policy.
With the end of the cold war, candidate Clinton argued, American foreign policy had to meet novel challenges
as it prepared for the twentyfirst century. What was needed, Clinton said in 1991, was "a new vision and the
strength to meet a new set of opportunities and threats." "We face the same challenge today that we faced in
1946-to build a world of security, freedom, democracy, free markets and growth at a time of great change." In
candidate Clinton's view, the Bush administration had failed to articulate such a vision and to put into place a
post-cold war foreign policy strategy. Indeed, President George Bush's leadership, Clinton claimed, was
"rudderless, reactive, and erratic," while the country needed leadership that was "strategic, vigorous, and
grounded in America's democratic values."
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"While the Clinton administration has succeeded in identifying a set of [foreign 
policy] values, it has been less successful in presenting a coherent global vision 
and strategy to achieve those goals ... the question remains whether the Clinton 
administration's foreign policy orientation reflects the incipient elements of a 
new post-cold war order or a temporary interlude before the reemergence of a 
realist direction in foreign policy." 
Assessing Clinton's Foreign Policy 
at Midterm 
BY jAMES M. McCoRMICK 
Bill Clinton ran for president on the theme of change-change in domestic policy and change 
in foreign policy. With the end of the cold war, 
candidate Clinton argued, American foreign policy had 
to meet novel challenges as it prepared for the twenty-
first century. What was needed, Clinton said in 1991, 
was "a new vision and the strength to meet a new set 
of opportunities and threats." "We face the same chal-
lenge today that we faced in 1946-to build a world of 
security, freedom, democracy, free markets and growth 
at a time of great change." In candidate Clinton's view, 
the Bush administration had failed to articulate such a 
vision and to put into place a post-cold war foreign 
policy strategy. Indeed, President George Bush's leader-
ship, Clinton claimed, was "rudderless, reactive, and 
erratic," while the country needed leadership that was 
"strategic, vigorous, and grounded in America's demo-
cratic values." 
Once elected, President Clinton was determined to 
have a foreign policy rooted in a clear set of principles, 
derived from America's past and guided by a coherent 
and workable strategy. Moreover, domestic policy and 
foreign policy would be tied together in this approach. 
Only by shoring up economic and social strength at 
home would the United States be in a position to pur-
sue an effective economic and security policy abroad. 
However, while the Clinton administration has suc-
ceeded in identifying a set of values, it has been less 
successful in presenting a coherent global vision and 
strategy to achieve those goals. 
jAMES M. McCoRMICK is a professor of political science at Iowa 
State University An earlier version of this article, which draws 
on the author's American Foreign Policy and Process, 3d ed. 
(Itasca, Ill.: FE. Peacock Publishers, lnc.,forthcoming), was 
presented at the 1995 Fulbright American Studies Conference, 
University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, july 6-9,1995. He 
would like to thank Eugene Wittkopf for his comments. 
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fOREIGN POUCY PRINCIPLES 
In the past three years, Clinton or his representatives 
have sought to outline the administration's foreign pol-
icy on at least four different occasions. Although 
specifics have changed, some priorities can be identified. 
The first occasion was the election campaign of 
1991 and 1992. Despite his effort to downplay foreign 
policy in the campaign, Clinton supported global 
engagement by the United States and sought to restore 
more idealism to American foreign policy-especially 
by expressing a global commitment to democratization 
and human rights and chastising the previous admin-
istration's go-slow policy on aiding democratization in 
Russia, the lack of moral content in its policy toward 
Bosnia and Haiti, and its embracing of the Chinese 
government. In short, idealism would be reintegrated 
into American foreign policy. 
The second occasion was in early 1993, when the 
new Clinton administration attempted to be more spe-
cific about the key values that it wanted to pursue. In 
his confirmation hearings, Secretary of State-designate 
Warren Christopher summarized the administration's 
foreign policy principles under three simple, albeit not 
simplistic, headings. The first principle, one the admin-
istration claimed was its highest foreign policy priority, 
was United States economic security. The rationale for 
this principle had been stated early on in Clinton$ cam-
paign: "Our first foreign priority and our first domestic 
priority are one and the same: reviving our economy. 
America must regain its economic strength to play our 
proper role as leader of the world." Christopher com-
mitted the Clinton administration to "advance Amer-
ica's economic security with the same energy and 
resourcefulness we devoted to waging the cold war." 
To achieve economic security, the administration 
would develop an economic program making Ameri-
can companies and their workers more productive and 
more competitive abroad; it would try to put in place a 
strategy to reduce foreign borro>'ring to support federal 
budget deficits; and it would take the necessary steps 
to make America a more reliable and capable trading 
partner. Structurally, the administrallon would add an 
Economic Security Council to the pohcymaking appa-
ratus to complement the National Security Council 
and, as Clinton put it, ensure ''that economics is no 
longer a poor cousin to old-school diplomacy" 
While achieving economic security would he a cen-
tral foreign policy objective, it would not be pursued in 
a vacuum. Commercial goals Christopher noted, 
would not surpass all other concerns in dealing with 
states abroad. Advancing nuclear nonproliferation, pro-
moting human rights, and enhancing sustainable 
development in the third world would remain part of 
the policy mix. In other words, some hedging on the 
centrality of economics was offered immediately 
The second principle the Cinton administration 
advanced was the need to maintain a strong but more 
flexible defense to meet new and continuing security 
challenges. Deterrence would remain an important 
function of the armed services, but America's defenses 
would also have to be prepared to meet new threats 
and to undertake new missions. 
These threats would be distinct from those of the 
cold war years and would require continuous global 
attention and sustained readiness. Proliferation of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in several 
countries (for example, Iraq and North Korea); 
enhanced conventional weapons, wlth new and more 
dangerous delivery systems (for example, in the Middle 
East): the dangers of ethnic rivalries in various regions 
of the world (for example, the former Yugoslavia); and 
the possibility of disorder in the former Soviet Union 
would require new missions for the American military. 
Peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian missions, 
drug trafficking, and antiterrorism would likely become 
regular issues for United States national security policy 
Military force by the new administration would also 
be applied in a more calculated manner. American 
decision options must include, Christopher noted, 
more than "a choice between inaction or American 
intervention." Bilateral and multilateral approaches 
would be used, and collective security mechanisms 
would be employed when necessary and appropriate. 
The third foreign policy princtple was the promotion 
of democracy During the campaign, Clinton promised 
to place greater emphasis on promoting democracy 
abroad; he attacked the Bush administration's support 
of the "status quo": "From the Balttcs to BeiJing, from 
Sarajevo to South Africa, time after time, George Bush 
has sided with the status quo rather than democratic 
change-with familiar tyrants rather than those who 
would overthrow them-and wirh the old geography of 
repression rather than a new map of freedom.'· By con-
trast, he argued, "my administration will stand up for 
democracy.'' 
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The administration viewed these three initial "pil-
lars" of policy (as Christopher labeled them) as "mutu-
ally reinforcing." A strong economy would allow for a 
strong military, but not one that burdened the domes-
tic economy. A sound economy and a sound military 
would enable the United States to conduct its foreign 
policy with grater credibility and legitimacy. And by 
promoting democrac)~ old threats would be eliminated, 
new threats prevented, and new markets for American 
products and American investments opened. 
THE STRATEGY OF ENLARGEMENT 
The third occasion for outlining the Clinton 
approach occurred in September 1993, in the midst of 
policy problems concerning Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, and 
]';onh Korea. President Clinton and three of his key 
advisers--Christopher, National Security Adviser 
Anthony Lake, and Cl\ Ambassador Madeleine Al-
bright-tried once again to define America's post-cold 
war course. 
In response to fears that the United States was pur-
suing a ''neoisolationist" policy, Ambassador Albright 
was emphatic: "Our nation will not retreat into a 
post--cold war foxhole." Such fears had grown since the 
undersecretary of state for political affairs, Peter Tamoff, 
had called a few months earlier for a reduction in Amer-
ican involvement around the world because of domes-
tic budget constrains. Secretary of State Christopher had 
quickly rejected the idea, but Lake, Albright, Clinton, 
and Christopher himself felt it necessary to emphasize 
America's commitment to global engagement. 
Another clarification concerned whether the United 
States would act alone to protect its national interests 
or rely on collective security mechanisms such as the 
L:l\. Once again the administration was attempting to 
blunt criticism of the "assertive multilateralism" it had 
previously backed (and which Albright had endorsed 
in American policy toward Somalia). Strict reliance on 
unilateralism or multilateralism was rejected; instead, 
the United States would decide how to achieve its goals 
on a case-by-case basis. As Christopher noted, the 
question of unilateralism or multilateralism "creates a 
false polarity. It is not an either-or proposition." 
A third and related theme concerned the use of 
American forces-when they would be used, under 
what conditions, and under whose command. The 
administration codified a new, tougher position on the 
use of American forces in peacekeeping operations in 
the May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25. 
According to PDD-25, several conditions must exist 
before the United States becomes involved in peace-
keeping: there must be a threat to international secu-
rity, defined as the need for immediate relief efforts, a 
democratic challenge, or severe violations of human 
rights; clear objectives for the UN mission; and agree-
ment by all involved that the intervention should take 
place. Moreover, sufficient money and troops should 
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be available; a mandate appropriate to the mission 
must have been established; and an exit strategy must 
be in place. In addition, the administration down-
graded its commitment to create a UN army-a pledge 
that had been made during the presidential cam-
paign-and called for fewer u~ missions around the 
world. 
The administration also sought to identify policy 
priorities and the basic guidelines for American foreign 
policy. Clinton, in an address before the eN, focused on 
three substantive policy areas: conflict resolution 
around the world, nuclear nonproliferation, and the 
promotion of sustainable development. Lake, however, 
offered another approach: the promotion of democracy 
and open markets. As Lake put it, "the successor to a 
doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlarge-
ment-enlargement of the worlds free community of 
market democracies." 
Lake emphasized four key components of this strat-
egy of enlargement: "First, we should strengthen the 
community of major market democracies-including 
our own-which constitutes the core from which 
enlargement is proceeding. Second, we should help 
foster and consolidate new democracies and market 
economies where possible, especially in states of spe-
cial significance and opportunity. Third, we must 
counter the aggression-and support the liberalization 
of states hostile to democracy and markets. Fourth, we 
need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by 
providing aid but also by working to help democracy 
and market economics take root in regions of greatest 
humanitarian concern." The first component of 
enlargement was aimed at allies like Europe and japan; 
the second at new states like Russia and those in Cen-
tral Europe; the third at the so-called backlash states 
like Iraq or North Korea that had to be contained and 
countered; and the fourth at developing states. 
Despite the administration's effort to refocus Ameri-
can policy and to encapsulate it in a larger picture of 
global democratization, widespread support did not 
materialize. Not only was the American public uneasy 
about this commitment to global democratization, but 
the scope of the policy was perhaps beyond what the 
United States really was willing to do. Indeed, the 
administration did not effectively articulate a real strat-
egy for implementing "enlargement." 
fROM PRINCIPLE TO POLICY 
This january and February. Secretary of State Christo-
pher once again tried to articulate the Clinton adminis-
tration's foreign policy principles: a commitment to be 
engaged and to lead; a commitment to cooperative rela-
tions with powerful nations; a commitment to adapt and 
build economic and security institutions; and a commit-
!George Szamuely, "Clinton's Clumsy Encounter with the 
World," Orbis (Summer 1994), p. 393. 
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ment to support democracy and human rights. In 1995 
these principles would be applied to "advancing the 
most open global trading system in history; developing 
a new European security order; helping achieve a com-
prehensive peace in the Middle East; combating the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction; and fighting 
international crime, narcotics, and terrorism." 
As one would expect, articulating these various prin-
ciples has proved considerably easier than implementing 
them. Disjunctures between Clinton and Congress, and 
between Clinton and the military have effectively hin-
dered Clinton administration policies. Moreover, policy 
lapses quickly came to serve as a shorthand summary of 
the Clinton administration's difficulties in foreign affairs. 
Indeed, one critic summarized the Clinton approach as 
conducting foreign policy "as if it were on a supermar-
ket shopping spree, grabbing whatever it takes a fancy 
to, without worrying about the costs or whether the 
product is the right brand, or is genuinely needed." l 
The administration fared slightly better linking eco-
nomic security and foreign policy. A budget deficit 
package was developed and quickly passed by 
Congress in the summer of 1993, and the Tokyo sum-
mit that july briefly produced a "framework agree-
ment'' for reducing the trade deficit with japan. But by 
the end of june 1995, the United States and japan 
seemed headed for a trade war. 
The administration's efforts with the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were more 
promising. The administration campaigned vigorously 
for 1\AFTA and managed to gain passage of the agree-
ment in the House and Senate by November 1993. 
Within a month, a breakthrough occurred in the most 
recent round of the GATT negotiations and, again, after 
some lobbying efforts, that pact was also approved by 
Congress in November 1994. 
The Clinton administration initiated three other 
efforts in pursuing its goal of economic security. One 
was directed toward establishing a free trade area by 
2020 among the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
countries, which the forum agreed to at the November 
1994 APEC summit. The second was the December 1994 
"Summit of the Americas" conference. The meeting's 
aim was to set in motion the creation of a free trade zone 
throughout the Western Hemisphere; the conference 
attendees agreed to complete these talks by 2005, 
although the actual date for the elimination of all trade 
barriers was not set. The third effort, only recently pro-
posed this june, is to create a transatlantic trading bloc 
linking Europe and America. 
These multilateral policy actions-or what the 
administration calls "pluralilateral initiatives"-were 
fully compatible with the administration's policy goals, 
even as bilateral trade with japan and later with China 
was becoming more difficult. The administration no 
doubt wanted its foreign policy identified with its mul-
tilateral economic successes, but the administration's 
failures and shortcomings in dealing with more tradi-
tional political and military issues-and its departure 
from professed foreign policy principles-came to 
define its foreign policy record. 
In several instances Clinton's policy seemed to 
assume the "ad hoc'' approach of which the Bush 
administration had been accused. Caught between pro-
moting democracy and human right'i and fostering eco-
nomic secmity with China, the administration opted for 
the economic principle, despite a Clinton campaign 
pledge to do otherwise. Faced with the prospect of 
expanding American involvement in Bosnia in order to 
defend human rights there, the administration equivo-
cated. First it favored negotiations, then lifting the arms 
embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, and, more recently; it 
has opted for negotiation even as it sought to prohibit 
direct American involvement. Success may yet come 
from this approach, but it surely has been 
slow and haphazard. More generally. 
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More generally, can one even reasonably summarize 
the administration's underlying conceptual or theoreti-
cal approach? The Reagan administration has often 
been described as a throwback to the most frigid years 
of the cold war, but its priorities and policies were 
largely predictable. And while the Bush administration 
has variously been accused of "ad hocism," "pragma-
tism," or '·realism lite" in its foreign policy approach, it 
did offer a fairly steady course. Can one say the same 
about the Clinton administration's approach? 
Two concepts-free societies and free markets-
shape much of the Clinton agenda; they are also key 
tenets of liberal internationalism. However, these core 
components are not very distant from the ones pro-
moted by the Bush administration during its last 
months in office. In April 1992, Secretary of State 
James Baker 3d had argued for a new American foreign 
policy that would "replace the dangerous period of the 
cold war with a democratic peace-a 
peace built on the twin pillars of political 
however, the administration often vacil-
lated in its decision making (trade policy 
toward China), frequently proved indeci-
sive or unable to decide on its policy 




and regularly changed directions (negoti- too often become the 
ation or a "lift-and-strike" policy toward 
Bosnia). 
and economic freedom." The policy to 
build this peace, "collective engagement," 
would "allow the United States to rally 
like-minded nations on behalf of peace 
and to draw on international institutions 
where they can play a constructive part." 
The Bush administration's "collective 
engagement" and the Clinton administra-
tion's ·'engagement and enlargement'' are 
surely close cousins. 
Two exceptions to these problems 
were the administration's policies toward 
Russia and the Middle East. The admin-
istration has consistently supported Pres-
ident Boris Yeltsin's government. At thE' 
Aprill993 Vancouver summit, President 
catchwords for 
describing 
administration Still, the "open markets-open soci-
eties" approach reopens long-standing 
debates about two important propositions 
in international politics: the relationship 
between democracies and peace and the 
foreign policy. 
Clinton forcefully declared that "we 
actively support reform and reformers and you in Rus-
sia." Furthermore, the summit concluded with a com-
mitment by Clinton and Yeltsin to develop a "new 
democratic partnership" between the two nations. 
Even now support for Yeltsin, despite the violence in 
Chechnya, remains largely intact. Clinton's Middle East 
policy, too, has not faltered, with sustained efforts for 
the peace process and the initiation of "dual contain-
ment'' of Iran and Iraq. On balance, however, "indeci-
sive," "incoherent," and "inconsistent'' have too often 
become the catchwords for describing administration 
foreign policy, 
A LONGER TERM PERSPECTIVE 
To many analysts Clinton's policies seem to have the 
clear ring of an idealist or liberal internationalist 
approach to foreign policy-an approach generally 
consonant with America's past. Is the Clinton approach 
idealism in full voice? Or is it too optimistic and too 
"unrealistic," with a naive view of Ame1ica's ability to 
build democracy worldwide, achieve global justice, and 
constmct global institutions? 
Copyright (c) 2004 ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
Copyright (c) Current History, Inc. 
relationship between free markets and peace. 
In general, many studies seem to provide compelling 
evidence for the argument that democracies do not fight 
one another and have mechanisms for resolving their 
disputes. The problem is, how does one go about build-
ing democracies? More specifically for the United 
States, does it have "the will and the wallet" to under-
take such a task? And even if the democratic peace 
proposition is a true guide for future global order, the 
transition from nondemocracies to democracies could 
seriously destabilize the global community. While the 
end condition of a democratic world may be pacific, the 
process of building a democratic order and the move-
ment toward "mature democracies" may not be. 
The other tradition rooted within the Clinton 
approach, is, of course, the belief in the pacifying 
effects of free markets. This approach grows out of the 
functionalist school of international politics-more 
cooperation in so-called low politics arenas will even-
tually yield cooperation in high politics arenas as well. 
It also grows out of the controversial idea that states 
and societies are more interested in their own absolute 
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gains than in their relative gains vis-a-vis their neigh-
bors or trading partners. Thus, absolute gains by all 
participants in a cooperative venture (such as in a trad-
ing bloc) will be the driving force in sustained cooper-
ative relations among states. 
With the growing number of these free trade areas 
and potential free trade areas, the argument will surely 
be tested in the 1990s and beyond. Will '"'AFTA, ASEAN, 
APEC, the proposed Western Hemisphere free trade areas, 
an expanding EU, and even a North America-European 
pact become the model for this new global order or the 
source of rivalry? And is the promotion of democracy 
always compatible with the promotion of free trade and 
open markets or vice versa? Sino-American relations are 
a case in point. The Clinton administration has opted to 
promote open markets and has downplayed efforts to 
create a more open society in China. Similarly, will NAFTA 
have a democratizing effect on Mexico, as some propo-
nents have argued, or will it exacerbate rivalries in that 
country because of increasing income gaps? 
Finally, both philosophical traditions are largely 
heresy to many analysts schooled in the realist tradition 
of international relations, where the state, its interests, 
its power, and the balance of power form the core of 
international politics. The type of domestic regime and 
absolute gain from cooperative ventures are less rele-
vant than the anarchic conditions of the international 
system and the relative gains sought by states. Many 
analysts schooled in realist foreign policy, including 
Anthony Lake, may have trouble sustaining these other 
perspectives. 
There are, however, elements of realism in the Clin-
ton approach. In Bosnia, despite the horrors of ethnic 
cleansing, the administration has until very recently 
adopted a selective, detached policy because a clear 
national interest could not be discerned-not far from 
what some realists might suggest. And Clinton's China 
policy represents the realist approach in full bloom. 
Idealism or neoliberal principles have largely been 
abandoned for economic and strategic considerations 
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because China is simply too large a market and too 
crucial an area. Delinking human rights conditions 
from the granting of most favored nation trade status 
was an action more realist in form than anything car-
ried out in Sino-American relations during the Reagan-
Bush years. 
SUMMING UP 
The Clinton administration has sought to develop a 
particular kind of liberal internationalism in which 
American foreign policy serves as a guiding force in the 
post-cold war era, but at the same time, the world 
shapes American actions in a more dynamic manner. 
Yet caution is necessary in assessing how far the 
Clinton administration strategy has come. While 
American policy has surely changed in selected foreign 
economic and social areas, the administration's actual 
political and military policies have not yet achieved a 
wholly consistent focus and direction either for the 
United States or the global community. NAFTA and GATT 
will likely be seen as the success stories of the Clinton 
years, but the administration's political-military policy 
from Russia and Bosnia to Somalia, Haiti, and North 
Korea will receive more mixed reviews. 
The Clinton administration has adopted some his-
torical philosophical underpinnings for its foreign pol-
icy, but it has not yet created a clear strategy for 
achieving them in the post-cold war era. Although the 
administration has committed the United States to con-
tinued global involvement and some lofty global goals, 
it has failed to rally the American public or the Ameri-
can Congress behind these goals. 
In short, the question remains whether the Clinton 
administration's foreign policy orientation reflects the 
incipient elements of a new post-cold war order or a 
temporary interlude before the reemergence of a real-
ist direction in foreign policy. In light of the foreign 
challenges it faces today and the state of domestic 
politics at home, it will likely be more the latter than 
the former. • 
